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1This journal 26 (2002), 155–77 (quote, p. 157).
2Or Elizabeth McCombie, whose book Mallarmé and
Debussy: Unheard Music, Unseen Text (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003) is an examination of the parallels
between Debussy’s aesthetics and Mallarmé’s based on an
analysis, not of Debussy’s words, but of his music, in
terms informed by Mallarmé’s critical discourse and po-
etic practice. McCombie provides perhaps the most pro-
ductive model we have for listening to Debussy in ways
structured by interdisciplinary reflection.
Nature, Music, and Meaning
in Debussy’s Writings
PETER DAYAN
I should say at the outset that this is an article,
not on Debussy’s music, but on his words. I am
not a musicologist; my experience, expertise,
and ambitions lie in the field of textual analy-
sis, particularly within the French post-Roman-
tic tradition. Nonetheless, I hope that what I
have to say may be of interest to musicologists.
I am encouraged in this hope by Matthew Riley’s
highly suggestive article “Rustling Reeds and
Lofty Pines: Elgar and the Music of Nature.”
Riley proceeds from the assumption that
“Elgar’s remarks can be read not merely as
biographical testimony but also as literary tropes
that have antecedents and contemporaneous
parallels.”1 I started from the same assumption
about Debussy’s writings and found them par-
ticularly interesting in the way that they fold
literary tropes into discourse on music.
The “antecedents and contemporaneous par-
allels” of Debussy’s writing style compose a
theoretical tradition within which the very defi-
nition of music depends on a paradoxical rela-
tionship with literature—and vice versa. This
relationship is present in Debussy’s texts, of-
ten in a peculiarly elliptical or understated form,
as if echoing the work of the poets he knew, in
turns of phrase and types of reasoning that might
well seem odd rather than revealing to a reader
not used to analyzing the literary syntax of the
time. My aim in writing this article was to see
what would happen if I tried to read Debussy in
the same way that I might read Mallarmé, or
Baudelaire, or Proust, while wondering how
such a reading might reflect on the way we
associate words with music (which is, doubt-
less, the main enterprise of musicology).
Whether these considerations can or should
affect our appreciation of the music—that ques-
tion, I do not, unlike Riley,2 address directly.
We will find that reasons emerge for deferring
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any answer to it; but it does seem to me, going
by his correspondence, that they affected De-
bussy’s approach to composition, and indeed
his ability to compose.
On 15 October 1905, Pierre Lalo published a
review of Debussy’s La Mer in which he criti-
cized the work for not representing its subject
realistically, immediately, or naturally enough.
It seemed to me that Debussy had willed himself to
feel, rather than feeling truly, deeply, naturally. For
the first time when listening to a picturesque work
by Debussy, I had the impression of being, not be-
fore nature, but before a reproduction of nature; a
marvellously refined, ingenious, and efficiently fab-
ricated reproduction, but a reproduction nonethe-
less. . . . I could not hear the sea, see the sea, smell
the sea.
(Il me semble que Debussy a voulu sentir plutôt
qu’il n’a vraiment, profondément et naturellement
senti. Pour la première fois, en écoutant une œuvre
pittoresque de Debussy, j’ai l’impression d’être, non
point devant la nature, mais devant une reproduc-
tion de la nature; reproduction merveilleusement
raffinée, ingénieuse et industrieuse, mais reproduc-
tion tout de même. . . . Je n’entends pas, je ne vois
pas, je ne sens pas la mer.)3
Debussy replied ten days later (the delay is
perhaps not without significance), with, as Nigel
Simeone puts it, “wounded vigour.”4 The ques-
tion that interests me is: what wounded him?
What, exactly, does he object to in Lalo’s com-
ments, and so strongly that, he implies, he
would never have communicated with Lalo
again had Lalo not shown more understanding
when writing earlier about Pelléas et Mélisande?
Simeone suggests that it is “the charge of stu-
dio-bound artificiality which [Debussy] had so
strenuously sought to avoid.”5 This would, I
think, be the natural assumption of the mod-
ern concertgoer, who would expect Debussy to
want his work to be perceived as containing a
natural expression of the sea. If one reads the
letter carefully, however, one begins to con-
ceive that exactly the opposite may be true.
Debussy is not concerned to defend his music
on the grounds that it really does render present
the sea. On the contrary: his aim is to refuse
Lalo the right to judge music, any music, on
such grounds. In fact, his starting point, in his
letter, is not to defend La Mer against Lalo’s
criticism; it is to defend his other works against
Lalo’s praise.
Lalo had appeared to say that some pieces by
Debussy were admirable because, unlike La
Mer, they did give him the impression of being
immediately in front of nature herself. Debussy
indignantly refuses this as a criterion for appre-
ciating his work. He says at the very beginning
of the letter that he doesn’t mind Lalo not
liking La Mer. But he very definitely does mind
Lalo appreciating his earlier works on false
grounds:
My dear friend,
The fact that you do not like La Mer causes me
no difficulties and I have no intention of complain-
ing about that . . . but I part company with you when
you use this as a pretext for suddenly deciding that
my other works are lacking in logic and are only
held together by an obstinate attachment to feelings
and an equally obstinate searching after the “pictur-
esque” . . . . Truly! dear friend, though I may not
have learnt music as you understand it, nonetheless
I am an artist.
(Mon cher ami,
Il n’y a aucun inconvénient à ce que vous n’aimiez
pas La Mer et je ne veux pas m’en plaindre . . . mais
je ne puis vous suivre quand vous en prenez prétexte
pour trouver tout à coup, que mes autres œuvres
manquent de logique et ne se soutiennent que par
une sensibilité tenace et une recherche obstinée de
“pittoresque.” . . . Vraiment! cher ami, si je ne sais
3Lalo’s text is quoted in a footnote to Debussy’s
Correspondance 1884–1918, ed. François Lesure (Paris:
Hermann, 1993), p. 207. All references to Debussy’s writ-
ings are either to this edition or to Monsieur Croche et
autres écrits, ed. Lesure (Paris: Gallimard, 1971), hence-
forth abbreviated Correspondance and Monsieur Croche.
The texts in these volumes may generally be found trans-
lated into English, either in Debussy Letters, ed. François
Lesure and Roger Nichols, trans. Nichols (London: Faber,
1987), or in Debussy on Music, coll. and intro. Lesure, and
ed. and trans. Richard Langham Smith (London: Secker
and Warburg, 1977); my notes allow quoted texts to be
located in these editions by their date, but the translations
given here are mine.
4Nigel Simeone, “Debussy and Expression,” in The Cam-
bridge Companion to Debussy (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003), p. 108. Simeone gives the date of
the review by Lalo as 16 February; this must be a mistake. 5Ibid.
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pas la musique comme vous l’entendez, je suis tout
de même un artiste.)6
There are plainly some unspoken assumptions
filling a gap between Lalo’s article and Debussy’s
letter. As we will see, these assumptions are
constants in Debussy’s thought. They are also
constantly unspoken as well as, I think, gener-
ally missed, and it is well worth teasing them out.
What Lalo actually said was, first, that more
than one of Debussy’s earlier works seemed to
him “pittoresque,” and, second, that these
works gave him a sense of being “before na-
ture.” This plainly seems desirable to Lalo.
Debussy, however, thinks that to attribute these
qualities to his works is to say that they are
“lacking in logic,” that they “are only held
together by an obstinate attachment to feel-
ings,” and that their author is not an artist.
What explains this apparently bizarre interpre-
tation? It is Debussy’s rejection of Lalo’s no-
tion that one should feel before the work of art
that one is before nature. That, to Debussy, is
mere “sensibilité,” that is, an openness to emo-
tion caused immediately by identifiable exter-
nal stimuli, and he rejects it as contrary to the
very essence of music. For Debussy, the logic
of art, which every artist seeks by definition, is
something whose connection to nature—if it
has one—must always remain invisible, mys-
terious, intangible.
Debussy never sought to deny that listeners
and composers alike are endlessly susceptible
to seeing expressive connections between mu-
sic and the world outside music. However, he
firmly rejected the notion that such connec-
tions had anything to do with the value of the
music. He believed equally firmly that true
music was incapable of transmitting them; nor
should it aim to.7 Thus, on more than one
occasion, he notes that certain passages in his
compositions evoke, to him, specific scenes
that the listener would never know about or
guess at, but that this apparent failure of com-
munication is of no importance from the strictly
musical point of view. For example, in Iberia:
there is a man selling water-melons and a group of
boys whistling; I see them quite clearly. . . . And yet,
you see how easy it is to deceive oneself, since some
people think that passage is a serenade. Anyway, the
matter is of no importance at all, no more than an
article by Lalo.
(il y a un marchand de pastèques et des gamins qui
sifflent, que je vois très nettement. . . . Et pourtant
regardez comme on peut se tromper, puisqu’il y a
des gens qui ont pris cela pour une sérénade. Ça n’a
d’ailleurs aucune importance, pas plus qu’un article
de Lalo).8
One could go further. Not only is the transmis-
sion of such visions of no importance: the kind
of music that is indeed able to portray specific
scenes is unworthy of the name of music. Popu-
lar it may be; music it is not, and Debussy is
more than happy to leave that sort of musical
imitation to despised figures like Charpentier,
author of the popular opera Louise:
Please believe that the music of “Fêtes” was as al-
ways shaped by impressions that were already dis-
tant, of festivities in the bois de Boulogne; the “imagi-
nary procession” was on that particular day com-
posed of cuirassiers! . . . You won’t hold it against
me that since that day, the trumpets have become
veiled, and Liane de Pougy has ceased to be recogniz-
able.—Let’s leave fanfares to the barracks and Liane
de Pougy to the immortal author of Louise.
(Croyez que la musique de “Fêtes” fut comme
toujours adaptée à des impressions déjà lointaines
d’une fête au bois de Boulogne; le “cortège
chimérique” était, ce jour là, formé de cuirassiers!
. . . Vous ne m’en voudrez pas si, depuis, les
trompettes se sont voilées et que l’on ne reconnaît
plus Liane de Pougy.—Laissons les sonneries aux
casernes et Liane de Pougy à l’immortel auteur de
Louise.)9
6Correspondance, p. 207 (25 Oct. 1905).
7I seek here only to elucidate Debussy’s beliefs on this
matter; but their broader context is certainly fascinating.
Lawrence Kramer’s Musical Meaning: Toward a Critical
History (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of Califor-
nia Press, 2001) contains a sustained and often brilliant
reflection on the subject of how meanings become attached
to music, based primarily on examples from a historical
period in which Debussy is central; however, Debussy is
not one of the composers on whom Kramer’s book con-
centrates. Perhaps this article could be seen as a modest
speculation within that gap.
8Correspondance, p. 264 (25 Feb. 1910).
9Ibid., p. 161 (11 Feb. 1901).
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Debussy is perfectly willing to admit (here to
Dukas) that specific impressions are associated,
for him personally, with particular works. But
these impressions are “already distant” even
for him, and they are impossible for the lis-
tener to recognize. This impossibility is ex-
pressed, in his description of the appearance of
the finished work, by the metaphor of the veil,
common in his writing (and in Romantic and
post-Romantic aesthetic theory generally), and
by the affirmation that the individual figures in
Debussy’s impression cannot be read into the
music itself. Charpentier can represent the well-
known courtesan Liane de Pougy because he is
not a musician; Debussy cannot represent her
because he is a musician.
Before coming back to this anonymizing ef-
fect of music, let us return to the letter to Lalo
about La Mer.
I love the sea; I have listened to it with the impas-
sioned respect that is its due. If I have transcribed
badly what it dictated to me, that is no concern
either of yours or of mine. And it is not true that all
ears perceive things in the same way; you must at
least accept that.
(J’aime la mer, je l’ai écoutée avec le respect passionné
qu’on lui doit. Si j’ai mal transcrit ce qu’elle m’a
dicté, cela ne nous regarde pas plus l’un que l’autre.
Et vous nous concéderez que toutes les oreilles ne
perçoivent pas de la même façon.)10
I can’t help suspecting that Lalo would have
found these three sentences quite incoherent.
The logic that links them is not apparent at
first sight. But the principles set out above
should help to explain that logic. Why should
Debussy first assert that he has indeed listened
to the sea, then affirm that it is irrelevant
whether he has transcribed well or badly what
it dictated to him? If he values (as he plainly
does) what the sea has told him, shouldn’t ac-
curate and comprehensible transcription be con-
sidered a virtue?
But no: to Debussy, initial impressions are
not to be denied; yet they have no fixed link to
the work of music. If La Mer is to be judged as
music, it cannot be judged as transcription; it
must not be seen as the incarnation of an im-
pression. Listeners will not all hear the same
scenes in the music (Debussy may hear whis-
tling children where someone else hears a ser-
enade), but that is of no relevance; it is the
business of neither the critic nor the composer.
Certainly, the impression was there, the sea
gave Debussy his starting point, or at least what
he, at the time, felt to be his starting point. But
as he makes music, the sea must recede to the
point where we cannot judge the music by the
accuracy of its representation.
In other words, whereas Lalo was distinguish-
ing between good musical representation (which
would seem natural) and bad musical represen-
tation (which would seem like a secondary re-
production, a reproduction of a reproduction),
to Debussy all musical representation, to put it
simply, is bad; all musical representation has
that secondary character Lalo attributes to La
Mer, a secondary character that both Debussy
and Lalo see as mechanical. In this sense,
Debussy’s theory of imitation clearly belongs
to a tradition that stretches from Baudelaire,
Mallarmé, and Villiers de l’Isle-Adam to
Derrida. He distinguishes between straightfor-
ward reproduction, which is a technical matter
of no interest to the artist, and the functioning
of art, in which imitation and technique are
necessary concepts but no more (and no less)
necessary than an endless meditation on the
obstructions and limits to imitation. He also
subscribes, like Baudelaire, Mallarmé, and
Villiers, to the notion that the public unfortu-
nately prefers mechanical reproduction to true
art (which would be why he is less popular
than Charpentier). Hence Debussy’s reaction
to the most famous instance of musical repre-
sentation in an instrumental work, Beethoven’s
Sixth Symphony:
In short, the popularity of the Pastoral Symphony
arises from the misunderstanding which more or
less generally prevails between nature and man. Take
the scene by the stream! . . . Oxen apparently come
to drink from it (so the voice of the bassoons invites
me to believe); not to mention the wooden nightin-
gale and the Swiss cuckoo, which belong more to
the art of M. de Vaucanson than to any nature wor-
thy of the name . . . all this is pointlessly imitative, a
purely arbitrary interpretation.
The old master has written pages which contain10Ibid., pp. 207–08 (25 Oct. 1905).
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far more profound expression of the beauty of the
countryside, simply because they give us no direct
imitation, but instead a transposition for the senti-
ments of what is “invisible” in nature.
(En somme, la popularité de la Symphonie pastorale
est faite du malentendu qui existe assez généralement
entre la nature et les hommes. Voyez la scène au
bord du ruisseau! . . . Ruisseau où les bœufs viennent
apparemment boire [la voix des bassons m’invite à le
croire], sans parler du rossignol en bois et du coucou
suisse, qui appartiennent plus à l’art de M. de
Vaucanson qu’à une nature digne de ce nom . . . tout
cela est inutilement imitatif ou d’une interprétation
purement arbitraire.
Combien certaines pages du vieux maître
contiennent d’expression plus profonde de la beauté
d’un paysage, cela simplement parce qu’il n’y a plus
d’imitation directe mais transposition sentimentale
de ce qui est “invisible” dans la nature.)11
The word “transposition” here signals a key
concept of Mallarmé, explained notably (in typi-
cally elliptical style) in his essays “Averses ou
Critique” and “Théodore de Banville.”12 Trans-
position is the movement that leads away from
the world of facts (as recounted by journalists)
toward an ideal medium in which the con-
struction of sense is a game whose rules appear
derived from the medium itself. In Mallarmé’s
case that medium is language; in Debussy’s,
music. Music, therefore, like poetry, tells no
tales of real life:
We should be able to find something without turn-
ing into novelists or crime reporters. It is further-
more unnecessary for music to make you think! . . .
All we need is for music to force people to listen, in
spite of themselves . . . for them to find themselves
incapable of formulating anything like an opinion . .
for them to think they have dreamed, for an instant,
of an imaginary country, nowhere to be found be-
cause imaginary.
(Sans aller jusqu’au fait divers, ou au roman, on
pourrait trouver quelque chose. Il est même inutile
que la musique fasse penser! . . . Il suffirait que la
musique force les gens à écouter, malgré eux . . . et
qu’ils soient incapables de formuler n’importe quoi
ressemblant à une opinion . . . qu’ils pensent avoir
rêvé, un moment, d’un pays chimérique et par
conséquent introuvable.)13
Music for Debussy should not enable us to
formulate an opinion; it should not evoke in
our minds any realistic tableau; it should merely
make us think we have dreamed of a place that
(unlike the sea) does not and cannot exist.
This notion was, as Lalo’s attitude shows,
neither generally understood nor uncontro-
versial in Debussy’s time. It did, however, at
least relate fraternally to a certain literary tra-
dition that remained vigorous until the death
of Mallarmé; a tradition that, in France, I think,
lived on, through the inheritance of Mallarmé’s
ideas, one might say until the death of Derrida.
Today, though, and especially in the English-
speaking world, I see few echoes of it, few
grounds for supposing that these values would
be appreciated or deemed to be of much inter-
est. They would doubtless be assimilated, with
hindsight, to the generally discredited nine-
teenth-century philosophy of “absolute music.”
Daniel Chua’s Absolute Music and the Con-
struction of Meaning14 provides a critique of
the prehistory and development of this phi-
losophy and shows clearly why its essentialism
should appear to us so suspect, so close to mys-
tification, and why we have come to focus again,
not on the difficulty of associating meanings
with music, but on how that association has
been and may be established. But Chua’s very
rigor leads him to (or, perhaps, is rendered pos-
sible only by) a millenarian, indeed apocalyp-
tic, conclusion that many will find as suspect
as the philosophy he criticizes. It seems to me
11Monsieur Croche, p. 94 (16 Feb. 1903). Vaucanson was a
celebrated eighteenth-century maker of automata, includ-
ing an automatic flautist, and a particularly famous duck
with a fully functioning digestive tract. Arthur B. Wenk,
in Claude Debussy and the Poets (Berkeley and Los Ange-
les: University of California Press, 1976), draws attention
to the problem of representation in Debussy’s music (as
well, pp. 69–73, as to the question of Baudelairean corre-
spondences, which I discuss below), but his grasp of
Debussy’s essential distinctions between imitation, trans-
lation, and transposition is so shaky that he can quote the
last sentence of this passage affirming that it expresses
Debussy’s admiration of the Pastoral Symphony (p. 68),
whereas in fact it expresses precisely the opposite.
12See Mallarmé, Œuvres complètes, vol. II (Paris: Gallimard,
Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 2003), pp. 331 and 144.
13Correspondance, p. 162 (11 Feb. 1901).
14Daniel Chua, Absolute Music and the Construction of
Meaning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
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that the proposition that music must have
meaning is as much of a mystification as the
proposition that music must not have mean-
ing. We have learned, in practice, to occupy
and make fertile the ground between those two
propositions.15 In the long term, though, that
fertile space can be maintained only if we re-
tain our ability to identify with each of the
propositions that bound it. This identification
requires the courage to absorb a certain irony—
the irony, precisely, of unavoidable mystifica-
tion. In this study, I would like to respect
Debussy’s own courage. Therefore, I will not
attempt a truly critical reading. Rather, I would
like to explore how he thinks, and why, and
where he leaves the relationship between mu-
sic, letters, and nature. Certainly, I do not ex-
pect any stable conclusions. One of the ironies
of this type of thinking is the instability of its
results; so that, for example, Berlioz and
Debussy, who shared so many principles, ar-
rived, in many ways, at fundamentally opposed
positions.
Debussy, as we have seen, did not accept the
popular view that Beethoven’s Pastoral Sym-
phony was good music because it presented
nature. Berlioz saw things differently. “But
Beethoven’s poem! . . . with its endless periods,
so rich in colour! . . . its images, that speak to
us! . . . its fragrances! . . . its light! . . . its
eloquent silence! . . . its vast horizons! . . . its
enchanted woodland solitudes!” (Mais le poëme
de Beethoven! . . . ces longues périodes si
colorées! . . . ces images parlantes! . . . ces
parfums! . . . cette lumière! . . . ce silence
éloquent! . . . ces vastes horizons! . . . ces
retraites enchantées dans les bois!)16 Berlioz
positively appreciated, as Lalo might have done,
the synaesthetic appeal of the work. He seems
to take pleasure in describing it through refer-
ence to a broad range of extramusical experi-
ences: to sight and smell, certainly, but also to
verbal language (evoked in the oxymoronic ex-
pressions “images parlantes” and “silence
éloquent”) and, right at the outset, to litera-
ture. To Berlioz, describing a work of music as
a “poëme” is obviously the highest praise. Not
so to Debussy, for whom (in principle, though
we will see below the limits of this principle)
music should be perceived as nothing other
than music. Hence his rejection of Berlioz’s
aesthetic and his suspicion that Berlioz’s mu-
sic is in a sense not real music, but a fraud or
hoax. Berlioz, he says, “was, in my opinion, a
prodigious hoaxster, who managed to believe
in his own hoaxes” (fut, je crois, un prodigieux
fumiste, qui arriva à croire lui-même à ses
fumisteries).17
The ultimate “fumisterie” is the notion that
music can tell a story. That task Debussy as-
signs, not merely to verbal language, but spe-
cifically to journalism, in other words to the
least artistic type of language use according to
Mallarmé’s classification: “Some people would
have music serve to recount base anecdotes!
when newspapers are perfectly adequate to per-
form this task” (L’on voudrait qu’elle [la
musique] serve à raconter de basses anecdotes!
quand les journaux s’acquittent à merveille de
ce soin.)18
Plainly, in implying that some composers
try to fool us into thinking that music can tell
stories, Debussy has program music in mind.
His lifelong condemnation of program music is
consistent with the principles behind these re-
marks. Music should not present a story; music
should not attempt to do what language does; it
should be itself. Individuals, be they compos-
ers, performers, or listeners, may form associa-
tions in their heads with extramusical elements,
natural or literary. Nonetheless, a certain mys-
tery, a veil, must always remain between any
such associations and the music itself, in which
they are never present. In reaction to Strauss’s
Tod und Verklärung, Debussy writes:
In any case, if people are going to start trying to
understand what happens in a symphonic poem, then
15Among the critics who have tilled this ground, Lawrence
Kramer stands out by virtue of his careful attention to the
necessity of maintaining both propositions, and navigat-
ing between them. To give just one brief example (from a
discussion of song in Schubert and George Eliot): “Mean-
ing . . . remains the very nucleus of song. But any under-
standing of song does need to take account of how and
why meaning is so regularly cast off” (Musical Meaning,
p. 66).
16A travers chants (Paris: Michel Lévy frères, 1862), p. 39.
17Correspondance, p. 72 (letter to André Poniatowski, Feb.
1893).
18Ibid., pp. 72–73.
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we ought to give up writing them.—Reading those
little guides, in which the letters of the alphabet
represent clauses to be assembled into a sentence
which is itself a rebus that one tries to solve during
the performance, will certainly not put an end to the
frequent misunderstandings between author and lis-
tener. . . . There is no need for programs, which
attract literature “as to a honey-pot”; music, just
music, bare music, is enough.
(D’ailleurs, si l’on se mêle de vouloir comprendre ce
qui se passe dans un poème symphonique, il vaut
mieux renoncer à en écrire.—Ce n’est certes pas la
lecture de ces petits guides, où les lettres de l’alphabet
représentent des membres de phrases-rébus, que l’on
essaie de résoudre pendant l’exécution, qui fera cesser
les fréquents malentendus entre l’auteur et l’auditeur
. . . il n’est pas besoin de programme, qui attire la
littérature “comme miel,” la musique la plus simple,
la plus nue, y suffit.)19
Fifteen years earlier, at the time of his first
sallies into the field of the symphonic poem, he
had expressed a similar opinion, referring to his
own work Printemps: “In all this, naturally, no
program, as I have a profound disdain for music
that has to follow a little piece of literature
which, as one enters, one finds kindly thrust
into one’s hand.” (Tout cela naturellement sans
programme, ayant un profond dédain pour la
musique devant suivre un petit morceau de
littérature qu’on a eu le soin de vous remettre
en entrant.) Or, writing to fellow composer
Raymond Bonheur: “All I want is the assent of
people who, like you, have no human interest
in simplistic programs and are good enough to
believe in music unalloyed.” (Je veux
simplement l’assentiment de gens qui, comme
toi, sont humainement désintéressés des
programmes trop faciles et veulent bien croire
à une musique sans alliage.)20
But where, precisely, is this music “sans
alliage”? In practice, its existence is hard to
maintain. As we have seen, composers and lis-
teners alike, even if their heart is in the right
place, even if they “veulent bien croire” in
music unalloyed, seem unable to resist the at-
tribution of meaning; almost as soon as they
hear a specific piece of music, it conjures up
extramusical connotations.21 The need to fig-
ure an escape from this dynamic, to identify a
musicality that does not produce this effect,
leads Debussy, paradoxically, back to Nature.
The same twist, the same return to Nature, is
to be found in Mallarmé, and for analogous
reasons.
In a letter of 1911 to Roger Godet, one of the
privileged friends to whom Debussy seems to
have felt able to expose his thoughts just as
they occurred to him, we find a progression of
ideas that sums up beautifully this aesthetic
logic. He begins from a planned future perfor-
mance of his opera in Geneva; he fears that it
will not succeed due to its lack of “emotional
program.” We recognize here his conviction
that popularity requires a program, whereas his
music has none. (It may seem curious that he
should consider his opera to have no such pro-
gram; it is beyond my powers to analyze the
opera itself to explain this, but I hope that
Debussy’s contention is now at least compre-
hensible as part of an aesthetic system.) He
goes on to speculate about the Geneva public:
he imagines it as unmusical because it is com-
posed of professors who only recognize ideas
when they are formally dressed up. Music, as
we have seen, according to Debussy, should
contain no such ideas. Then he says he would
infinitely prefer listening to the wind on the
mountains with Godet.
Prefer this to what? Listening to Pelléas in
Geneva? It is not quite clear; what is clear is
that he immediately proceeds to describe the
wind as creating music. But this would be a
music that, obviously, since it has been created
by no human agency, cannot be received as the
transmission of any human sense at all. Can
music be said to exist in the absence of per-
ceived human meaning? Yes and no. It makes
no sense to define it thus, and yet Debussy’s
19Monsieur Croche, p. 215 (S. I. M., Dec. 1912).
20Correspondance, p. 49 (9 Feb. 1887), and p. 61 (5 Oct.
1890).
21Proust shares this perception. In A la recherche du temps
perdu, to attribute meaning to music is to betray it, yet no
one can long resist the temptation to do so. For an exami-
nation of how this dynamic emerges in the work, see my
“On the Meaning of ‘Musical’ in Proust,” in Word and
Music Studies: Essays in Honor of Stephen Paul Scher and
on Cultural Identity and the Musical Stage, ed. Suzanne
M. Lodato, Suzanne Aspden, and Walter Bernhart
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2002), pp. 143–58.
This content downloaded from 129.215.149.97 on Mon, 2 Sep 2013 04:58:37 AM







aesthetic logic, like Mallarmé’s, inexorably
pushes us toward a point of view from which
the appearance of beauty is dependent on the
erasure of meaning, so that the most beautiful
of sentences is the one that says nothing:
I am a little fearful for Pelléas in Geneva. It doesn’t
have at all the manners one needs to please people
there, or to be pleased to be there. . . . Its emotion
without program, without leitmotif, will appear in-
decent! Of course I may be wrong, but I have a
suspicion that Geneva is populated by professors,
and ideas are only admitted in white tie.
Now what I would find infinitely more tempting
would be to go with you and listen to the wind on
the mountains! . . . You can be sure that it will sing
only an unnumbered music composed of all the har-
monies it picks up as it passes over the tops of the
trees (this sentence is all the more beautiful because
it is determined to mean nothing!).
(Je crains un peu Genève pour Pelléas. Il n’a pas du
tout les manières qu’il faut pour y plaire et même
pour s’y plaire . . . Son émotion sans programme,
sans leit-motiv, sera prise pour de l’indécence!
Maintenant je me trompe peut-être, mais tout de
même il me semble que Genève est un nid à
professeurs où les idées ne sont admises qu’en cravate
blanche.
Par exemple, ce qui me tente infiniment plus
c’est d’aller écouter le vent sur la montagne avec
vous . . . ! Soyez assuré qu’il ne chantera que cette
musique innombrable faite de toutes les harmonies
qu’il recueille en passant sur la cime des arbres [cette
phrase est d’autant plus belle qu’elle ne veut
résolument rien dire!]).22
Nothing, “rien”; “ne rien vouloir dire,” to
mean or to say nothing, to want to say nothing;
the degree of beauty depending on the degree to
which one says nothing; these notions go back
at least to Flaubert’s intuition, more than fifty
years earlier, that the highest literary ambition
would be to write a book about nothing, a “livre
sur rien.” And when, in La Musique et les
Lettres, Mallarmé, with mock reluctance, con-
sents to an “impious taking to pieces”
(démontage impie) of the mechanism of litera-
ture, its mainspring turns out to be nothing,
“rien.” Literature is about nothing, it presents
nothing and contains no formal white-tied
thoughts (“That’s just the point, I have no
thoughts, ever” [Justement je ne pense rien,
jamais]).23 From this remark, it becomes plain
why the poets of the period sought in literature
itself “music before all else” (De la musique
avant toute chose).24 For Mallarmé as for
Debussy, the least artistic of discourses is that
of the newspaper or the realist novel, which
claims to represent the truth. Literature, which
is formed from verbal language, the matter of
that unartistic discourse, is thus, in its refusal
of content, permanently in reaction against its
own substance. The same could be said of the
other arts that were, at the time, perceived to
operate within a representational language:
painting and sculpture. Music, on the other
hand, has the privilege of not initially appear-
ing to represent; and this condition endlessly
attracted the other arts.
Nonetheless, while music itself remains of
right invulnerable to the ills of representation,
the musician must be constantly on guard
against those who, like Charpentier, Lalo, or
Berlioz, would seek to pervert our view by re-
ducing music to the imitation of this or that
work of literature or natural phenomenon. The
most radical defense against that perversion is
expressed in the adverb “infiniment” in
Debussy’s letter. An infinite temptation can-
not lead us to any piece of music in particular,
just as it cannot lead to any meaning or any
sense. It can only take us toward that which
lies beyond specific sense, beyond specific
works. But what is beyond specific works is
beyond any conceivable human music. Thus
Debussy reaches, like Mallarmé and Flaubert
before him, that forbidding aesthetic summit,
that wind-blown mountain-top, from which it
seems that the logic of artistic endeavor sum-
mons us to renounce all that is human in the
work of art: so literature kills literature, and
music kills music. It would be at least a
theoretically rewarding endeavor to analyze
Debussy’s repeated lamentations on his steril-
ity as a composer with these ideas in mind, and
22Correspondance, p. 298.
23Mallarmé, Œuvres complètes, II, 67, 258.
24These are the opening words of Verlaine’s famous “Art
poétique”; see Paul Verlaine, Œuvres poétiques complètes
(Paris: Gallimard, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1962), p. 326.
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to compare them to the similar lamentations
of his literary forebears.
But I imagine that anyone who, having read
Debussy’s letters and critical writings, has fol-
lowed my argument to this point, will be un-
comfortable. I have maintained that for Debussy
music cannot present or represent nature and
should not attempt to do so, and that to per-
ceive music in nature is to occupy a position
from which music becomes inhuman, and there-
fore humanly impossible to write. Yet, as many
critics have pointed out, Debussy also frequently
seems to regard nature as a model for music, to
posit a special relationship between music and
nature. I intend now to examine the dynamics
of that special relationship. We will see that,
despite appearances, if one reads carefully
enough the sentences in which Debussy sets
them out, they do not contradict my argument
so far. However, they do force us to perform
some peculiar theoretical acrobatics, in which
the relationship between nature and music
comes to interact in disconcerting ways with
the relationship between music and poetry.
Nowhere are these themes more clearly pre-
sented and more tightly intertwined than in an
article of 1915 that, at first reading, one might
take as an exhortation to composers to present
nature in music, the sort of thing that might
gladden the heart of Lalo. It concludes, indeed,
with a condemnation of Berlioz’s music
strangely similar to Lalo’s condemnation of La
Mer as a secondary reproduction:
Our symphonic painters really do not give suffi-
ciently fervent attention to the beauty of the sea-
sons. . . . And yet, music is precisely the art which is
closest to nature, the art which lays for her the most
subtle trap. Despite their claims to be acting as offi-
cial translators, painters and sculptors can only give
a more or less free and always fragmentary interpre-
tation of the beauty of the universe. They only seize
and note down one of its aspects, one of its mo-
ments; only musicians have the privilege of captur-
ing all the poetry of night and day, of earth and sky,
the privilege of reconstituting its atmosphere and
giving the rhythm of its immense palpitation. We
are aware that they do not exercise this privilege too
often . . . usually, their passion satisfies itself with
vegetation that literature has dried between the leaves
of its books. Berlioz asked for nothing more, all his
life. His genius took an astringent delight in wander-
ing nostalgically around a store of artificial flowers.
(Au fond, nos peintres symphonistes n’accordent pas
une attention assez fervente à la beauté des saisons.
. . . Or, la musique est précisément l’art qui est le
plus près de la nature, celui qui lui tend le piège le
plus subtil. Malgré leurs prétentions de traducteurs-
assermentés, les peintres et les sculpteurs ne peuvent
nous donner de la beauté de l’univers qu’une
interprétation assez libre et toujours fragmentaire.
Ils ne saisissent et ne fixent qu’un seul de ses as-
pects, un seul de ses instants: seuls, les musiciens
ont le privilège de capter toute la poésie de la nuit et
du jour, de la terre et du ciel, d’en reconstituer
l’atmosphère et d’en rythmer l’immense palpitation.
Nous savons que c’est un privilège dont ils n’abusent
pas . . . le plus souvent leur passion s’accommode
d’une végétation que la littérature a desséchée entre
les feuillets de ses livres: Berlioz s’en contenta toute
sa vie. Son génie trouva d’âpres délices à promener
sa nostalgie dans un magasin de fleurs artificielles.)25
It would certainly be possible, taking this
passage in isolation, to read it as revealing a
sort of Romantic faith in nature as the reposi-
tory of the truth that art seeks to reveal. After
all, it seems to imply that the task of the artist
is to give us “la beauté de l’univers.” But a
more careful reading reveals that at every turn,
using a technique strikingly similar to Proust’s,
Debussy interposes an operation between mu-
sic and nature. Music never renders nature
present; between nature and music there is al-
ways work to be done, a work of transposition
that denies the possibility of calculating an
equivalence between the music itself and that
which may exist outside it.
Debussy begins by giving his opinion that
“nos peintres symphonistes” do not give “une
attention assez fervente” to the seasons. Let us
recall his reaction to Lalo’s strictures on La
Mer. “I love the sea,” he said; “I have listened
to it with the impassioned respect that is its
due.” In neither text is there any suggestion
that the musician should imitate or represent
nature; what Debussy seems to value is a pas-
sionate personal reaction to nature. But what is
the relationship between that passion and art?
That remains unclear. Debussy’s next move,
here as in the letter to Lalo, is not to explain it,
but to figure the problematic point of contact
25Monsieur Croche, pp. 239–40 (S. I. M., 1 Nov. 1913).
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between music and nature. “Music is precisely
the art which is closest to nature, the art which
lays for her the most subtle trap.” Why is mu-
sic closer to nature than the other arts? Be-
cause, as we have seen, music’s advantage over
the other arts consists in its distance from mean-
ing; it does not represent, and neither does na-
ture. Music thus resembles nature far more
than do poetry or painting, which are immedi-
ately perceived as representing something out-
side themselves. For that very reason, nature
cannot appear to be present, to be contained
within music as it can appear to be contained
in the other arts. Hence Debussy’s careful for-
mula: music lays a trap for nature more subtle
than theirs.
We may fear that music’s subtle trap might
need to be a large one. For whereas the other
arts may, unsubtly, ensnare this or that facet of
nature, portray one of her faces, music, it would
seem, aims to capture her entire. I hope that
my preceding argument will have made it clear
why this should be: the infinite temptation,
dangerous though it is, is alone worthy of the
true artist; the particular can safely be left to
journalists. But I have also suggested that,
though music and nature may have a certain
endlessness in common, there is no presence in
nature that can simply pass into or be repre-
sented by music. Does Debussy here contradict
this suggestion by implying that the musician
captures nature in his trap? No. On the con-
trary: he continually, subtly, interposes between
music and nature a third term that allows each
to escape the other’s snare. Debussy says that
music lays a trap; he never says that nature
falls into it.
In a maneuver that perfectly mirrors the way
poets present their art as music, Debussy writes,
not of a direct relation between music and na-
ture, but of a relation between music and the
poetry of nature: “Only musicians have the
privilege of capturing all the poetry of night
and day, of earth and sky.” Before nature reaches
music, it must first transit through poetry,
through language, which is never wholeness
but always already division, articulation (note
that Debussy does not here utter the single
word “nature” but breaks nature’s image down
into two pairs of opposites). This, in a sense, is
bizarre. After all, Debussy has just been sug-
gesting that music, in its totalizing similarity
to nature, is superior to poetry; so what on
earth is poetry doing interposing itself between
music and nature? I will return to that ques-
tion, which is a central one, later; for now, I
would venture to suggest that we keep in mind
the reciprocity of this relationship. The poets
Debussy knew wrote about the music, the har-
mony, the rhythm of nature, in the same way
that Debussy, as musician, writes about the
poetry of nature. What is constant is the need
to present art, not as directly connected to na-
ture, but as the imitation of another art that
itself is inherent in nature.
But, one might ask, do we not here have that
structure of secondary representation that Lalo
saw in La Mer and Debussy in Berlioz? music
as an imitation of an imitation? Almost—but
not quite. The verb “capter” is another subtle
trap. “Capter” is not to capture in the way one
might capture a beast or a view; it is, rather, to
tap or channel, as one might the water of a
spring, or the interest of a listener. The impli-
cation is always that one diverts what is “capté”
from the course it would naturally have fol-
lowed. The following two infinitive verbs,
“reconstituer” and “rythmer,” indicate even
more clearly that the activity of the composer
is by no means a matter of faithful transcrip-
tion, of containing nature whole so that, as
Lalo might have liked, the listener feels placed
in front of her. The activity is a process of re-
creation, not of simple reflection. And what is
it in nature, exactly, that music does not imi-
tate but re-creates? An atmosphere; an immense
palpitation. These are qualities so vague, so
general, so universal, that their effect is to re-
move any possibility of determining, of calcu-
lating, of theorizing the link between music
and nature.
Furthermore, I have been guilty myself of a
reductive reading that oversimplifies the link
between music and nature. What is the ante-
cedent of the pronoun “en” that precedes the
verbs “rythmer” and “reconstituer”? Gram-
matically speaking, it must not, or at least may
not, be “nature,” but “poésie.” Once again,
Debussy subtly inserts veils between music
and nature. What can traverse them? Are there
any qualities that manage to survive the triple
filter of nature, poetry, and music?
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Only two, it would seem, to judge by this
passage: first, endlessness, and then the articu-
lation of time, which in nature is seen as palpi-
tation and in music or poetry as rhythm. Ar-
ticulation is, as Derrida shows, the beginning
of all human meaning; but seen as such, it is
precisely that which precedes meaning. What
music does with or to nature gives no full sense
to either. So in Debussy’s account, although
music is not an immediate presentation of na-
ture, neither can it be a secondary representa-
tion; it represents no thing at all.
Literature, on the other hand, so Debussy
has been telling us, can and does represent. It
does not aim solely at endlessness; it presents
fragments. The more pusillanimous musicians
will imitate it. They will indeed tell stories, as
poets do; and their works will be secondary
representations, and therefore not, to Debussy,
genuinely musical. Here we find again that op-
position between the natural and the artificial
that is a constant of Debussy’s writing on the
subject. The opposition is not, if I may be for-
given for laboring the point, between two kinds
of imitation, one natural and the other artifi-
cial; it is between imitation, which is always
artificial, always secondary, and true artistic
activity, which functions as an imitation of
nothing in particular—except perhaps of every-
thing. Most composers ignore this; “their pas-
sion satisfies itself with vegetation that litera-
ture has dried between the leaves of its books.
Berlioz asked for nothing more, all his life. His
genius took an astringent delight in wandering
nostalgically around a store of artificial flow-
ers.”
We have, then, in the passage I have been
analyzing, two completely different types of
reference to literature. In both, literature comes
between music and nature. But at one point it
represents an essential positive link in that
relationship: syntactically speaking, it is only
through “poésie” that music and nature reach
each other; whereas at another point, literature
is clearly a negative force, representing that
temptation of the fragmentary the brave musi-
cian must overcome.
Plainly, we have here the structure of what
Derrida calls the “supplement.” Poetry is both
necessary to music and the parasite that saps
its strength; poetry is both the source of music’s
life and an artificiality that threatens its vigor.
In the analysis of such supplements, one of the
main points of interest is always an investiga-
tion of the conditions that cause the supple-
ment to appear under its positive rather than
negative guise. In this case Debussy’s use of
poetry once again mirrors perfectly Mallarmé’s
use of music. For the positive poetry, according
to Debussy, the poetry that should come be-
tween nature and music is the poetry that does
not exist in the form of concrete works; it is
poetry in general, poetry in the abstract. Poetry
perceived as an artificial imitation, on the other
hand, consists of specific books, those that
Berlioz and other composers read, those that
contain the artificial flowers that seduced them.
What, then, of Debussy’s own use of specific
literary works? And what of his reference to
specific aspects of nature? Debussy did write
songs, and he composed Pelléas and Prélude à
“L’Après-midi d’un faune”: how could he dis-
tinguish between his own habits and those of
Berlioz? and why should we not see these com-
positions as secondary representations? Is not
Lalo’s reaction to La Mer, so similar to
Debussy’s reaction to Berlioz, perfectly under-
standable given the title that Debussy himself
had provided? Why, indeed, did Debussy give
such titles to his works at all?
To this question, there seems to me to be
quite a simple answer. It will seem odd to mod-
ern ears, but it would have seemed less so in
the aesthetic tradition of Baudelaire, Verlaine
and Mallarmé. It is this. Art represents noth-
ing, but is always initially taken to represent
something, by the artist and by the public. The
highest art, however, will attempt to be honest
by showing that this initial appearance of rep-
resentation is a falsification—precisely the fal-
sification of art. True art will therefore point to
the fact that it is a fiction, that as it appears to
represent, it lies. Debussy’s titles form part of
this strategy. They tap or channel our desire to
see representation in the music, and, having
caught us in this trap, they frustrate that same
desire by their inadequacy, their limitation, so
that we see through them to the music beyond.
They tell us, not that music presents nature,
but that music must be perceived in the space
between nature and human creativity, the space
where fiction is created. If music truthfully rep-
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resented anything, its value could be calculated
by the precision of that representation. Fortu-
nately, it does not, and the value of the glorious
lie that is art, according to Mallarmé, remains
incalculable: “Art is the most beautiful of lies .
. . we must desire that it should remain a lie;
the alternative would be for it to become some-
thing useful, as dull as a factory.” (L’art est le
plus beau des mensonges . . . il faut désirer qu’il
reste un mensonge, sous peine de devenir une
chose utilitaire, triste comme une usine.) We
can see now why this declaration is not in con-
tradiction with the affirmation, in the same ar-
ticle, that the “laws of beauty” (lois de beauté)
may be “inscribed in the totality of nature’s
movement” (inscrites dans le mouvement total
de la nature).26 The “mouvement total de la
nature,” nature as a totality articulated in time,
does correspond to the laws of beauty; but it
cannot be imitated or presented as a sense or
meaning; it cannot be said. Whatever art ap-
pears to say can only correspond to fragments
of nature, but that fragmentariness is denied by
art’s own nature. Art, therefore, does not really
say what it appears to say; if it says anything,
that thing is a lie.
This dual relationship between music and
nature parallels the dual relationship between
music and poetry. Just as there is a “good”
poetry that is conceived as a totality, so there
is a “good” nature, a totality of nature, with
which music has something essential in com-
mon; and just as there is a “bad” poetry, litera-
ture as a collection of works lending them-
selves to imitation, so there is a “bad” nature,
nature divided into scenes or meanings that
can be reproduced.
These two faces of nature appear in a single
sentence that Debussy writes about the com-
position of Pelléas. “I wanted for music a free-
dom which is in her more perhaps than in any
art, since she is limited not to a more or less
exact reproduction of nature, but to the myste-
rious correspondences between Nature and the
Imagination.” (Je voulais à la musique une
liberté qu’elle contient peut-être plus que
n’importe quel art, n’étant pas bornée à une
reproduction plus ou moins exacte de la na-
ture, mais aux correspondances mystérieuses
entre la Nature et l’Imagination.)27 The two
occurrences of the word “nature” in this sen-
tence are distinguished by the capitalization of
the second, which functions by correspon-
dences, not by the dynamic of representation.
These correspondences are mysterious (whereas
reproduction is not mysterious, but exact) in
the sense that their second term is in the imagi-
nation, not in reason; in the domain of fiction,
not of utility. If one holds on to this distinction
between reproduction and correspondence, the
former leading to a utilitarian truth, the latter
toward an imaginary one, many apparent con-
tradictions in Debussy’s aesthetic judgments
may be resolved.
For example, in his presentation of natural-
ness or realism in opera, it might seem that
Debussy justifies his own practice in Pelléas in
terms perilously close to those he uses to con-
demn Italian verismo. But there is a difference:
precisely the difference between correspondence
and representation. Of Pelléas, he writes: “The
characters in this drama attempt to sing like
natural people, and not in an arbitrary language
fabricated from outdated traditions.” (Les
personnages de ce drame tâchent de chanter
comme des personnes naturelles et non pas
dans une langue arbitraire faite de traditions
surannées.)28 Whereas he describes contempo-
rary Italian opera thus:
The aesthetic principle of this art form is certainly
false, because life is not to be translated by means of
songs, but Verdi has something heroic in the way
that he maintains a lie in the face of life which is
perhaps closer to beauty than the attempted reality
of the new Italian school. Puccini, Leoncavallo and
their ilk aim at a study of character, or even a sort of
brutal psychology, which in reality leads to nothing
more than anecdotes.
(L’esthétique de cet art est certainement fausse, parce
que l’on ne traduit pas la vie par des chansons, mais
il y a chez Verdi une façon héroïque de mentir à la
vie peut-être plus belle que l’essai de réalité tenté
par la jeune école italienne. Puccini, Leoncavallo
26Monsieur Croche, p. 67 (Musica, Oct. 1902), and pp. 66–
67.
27Ibid., p. 61 (April 1902).
28Ibid., p. 62.
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prétendent à l’étude de caractère, voire même à une
sorte de psychologie brutale qui n’aboutit, en réalité,
qu’à de la simple anecdote.)29
I hope that, in the light of my argument so far,
it will come as no surprise that Debussy praises
art as a lie (“mentir à la vie”), and refuses
anecdote (“en réalité”). But what, exactly, is
the difference between “singing like natural
people” (chanter comme des personnes
naturelles), which is what Debussy wanted his
characters to do, and “translating life by means
of songs” (traduire la vie par des chansons),
which is what the unmusical Italians do?
To begin with, note the contrast between
the plural noun “des chansons” and the verb
“chanter.” “Bad” nature, as we have seen, is
perceived as divided into scenes or fragments
like an opera divided into arias; “good” nature,
on the other hand, is a single “mouvement
total.” Whereas the characters in Italian operas
produce set pieces, Debussy’s characters are
engaged in a process. Nor is that process one of
reproduction. Italian opera, says Debussy, aims
to translate life, but translation normally pre-
supposes the existence of a preexistent text to
be translated. It thus allows the calculation of
an equivalence between source and target, pre-
cisely the calculation that, for Debussy, is the
antithesis of art. (Recall that painters and sculp-
tors are dismissed for perceiving their task as
that of “traducteurs-assermentés.”30) Debussy’s
characters translate nothing, imitate nothing;
indeed, it is not clear that they achieve any-
thing concrete at all. They attempt to sing.
Whether or not they succeed, whether or not
Debussy wishes them to succeed, we cannot
quite tell, but if they do, it is “like natural
people” (comme des personnes naturelles).
The word “comme,” which I have translated
as “like,” absent from the passage on Italian
opera and central to the description of Pelléas,
has long been recognized in French as the key
to poetic language, because it introduces all
kinds of imaginative comparisons. More par-
ticularly, it is the pivot of the theory, going
back to Baudelaire, of art not as imitation, but
as incalculable correspondence. In Baudelaire’s
famous sonnet “Correspondances,” the word
occurs six times. It becomes ubiquitous, often
surreptitiously and inconspicuously so, in
Mallarmé as in Proust. What it signifies is a
relationship of neither identity nor imitation,
nor of any calculable translation, but one that
depends on an imaginative perception. In his
opera, as we have seen, Debussy wanted a mu-
sic limited to the “mysterious correspondences
between Nature and the Imagination”; precisely
this correspondence is evoked here. What, after
all, can it mean to “chanter comme des
personnes naturelles”? What are “personnes
naturelles”? If we take the phrase to mean
people as we encounter them in everyday life,
Debussy’s sentence is an obvious nonsense. But
if by “naturelles,” we understand “people who
retain the character of Nature,” of what I have
called “good” nature as opposed to the “bad”
nature that is always already imitation, the
position of this “chanter” becomes clear.
Debussy’s characters would like to be able to
sing as if they were part of that “mouvement
total” in which imagination finds a correspon-
dence to nature—or perhaps to poetry; but al-
ways a correspondence, never a translation or
an imitation.
This positioning of song explains many of
Debussy’s pronouncements on the setting of
texts to music. Music, to him, cannot express,
reflect, imitate, explain, or convey the sense of
any individual text; music and text must re-
late, as must music and nature, through unify-
ing imaginary correspondence alone. This rela-
tion Debussy describes in terms that present
music and text, not as reflections of each other,
but as parts of a single felt totality. He is un-
comfortable with the traditional vocabulary that
portrays a musician setting words to music; he
is even less enamored of the Wagnerian model,
of music as somehow structured by a text. He
prefers to think of music and text as one body.
Once they have come together in the work of
art, any calculation of their relationship would
destroy the sense of oneness that art requires,
and that requires in turn the mystery of corre-
spondence: “In the opinion of Mr Catulle
Mendès . . . I have not rendered ‘the poetic
essence of the play,’ and my music remains
‘independent of that essence.’ Yet I devoted all
29Monsieur Croche, p. 96 (Gil Blas, 16 Feb. 1903).
30See quotation from Monsieur Croche, pp. 239–40, above.
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my sincerity and all my efforts to the attempt
to identify the one with the other.” (M. Catulle
Mendès . . . estime que je n’ai pas rendu
“l’essence poétique du drame,” et que ma
musique reste “indépendante de celle-ci.” J’ai
pourtant tâché de tous mes efforts et de toute
ma sincérité d’identifier l’une à l’autre.)31
Just as he did not attempt to refute Lalo’s
criticism that La Mer did not render the sea
present, because it was not the role of music to
do so, so Debussy does not answer Mendès’s
charge that he has failed to “rendre l’essence
poétique du drame,” because the charge dem-
onstrates only that Mendès doesn’t know what
music is. What Debussy had tried to do is not
to render a preexistent essence, still less any
preexistent text; he aimed not to render any-
thing, but to operate an identification, to iden-
tify the music with the essence of the text, to
make of both a single unit, a totality. Similarly,
in Le Martyre de saint Sébastien: “I was apply-
ing my theories—if the expression may be al-
lowed—on music for the stage . . . which must
be closely wedded to the text, forming a single
body.” (J’ai mis à exécution mes théories—si je
puis dire—sur la musique de scène . . . qui doit
faire corps, étroitement, avec le texte.)32
A clue to the genealogy of these theories,
with their notion that music and text should
be identified with each other rather than re-
lated by way of interpretation, imitation, or
explanation, appears in a letter of 1885 in which
Debussy explains why he cannot continue with
an attempt to write an opera on a text written
in classical French verse.
Zuleima is dead and you won’t catch me trying to
resurrect it, I never want to hear about it again, as
it’s not at all the kind of music I want to make, I
want a kind of music so supple and so open to
contrasts that it can mold itself to the lyrical move-
ments of the soul, to the caprices of our daydreams.
(Zuleima est morte et ce n’est certes pas moi qui la
ferai ressusciter, je ne veux plus en entendre parler,
n’étant pas du tout du genre de musique que je veux
faire, j’en veux une qui soit assez souple, assez heurtée
pour s’adapter aux mouvements lyriques de l’âme,
aux caprices de la rêverie.)33
The last twenty words of this passage, as J.
Lesure points out in his note, quote the preface
to Baudelaire’s prose poems, in which Baudelaire
describes why he is attempting to write poetry
in prose rather than in verse (Debussy has sub-
stituted “musique” for Baudelaire’s “prose
poétique”). Like Debussy, Baudelaire desires a
certain physical identification between text
(musical, or prose-poetic) and pre-text (move-
ments of the soul or daydreams).
But the context of this passage should also
remind us of something Baudelaire and
Mallarmé had in common, something they ex-
pressed in the prefaces to their single work of
poetic prose: a sense of necessary failure. The
new type of prose that Baudelaire describes, in
the terms taken up by Debussy, is something,
he says, that he dreamt of, just as Debussy here
is saying not what he has done, but what he
would like to do. Baudelaire states that he has
in fact failed to realize his dream (“I was not
able to come anywhere near my mysterious
and brilliant model” [je restais bien loin de
mon mystérieux et brillant modèle].34)
Baudelaire’s model, Gaspard de la Nuit by
Aloysius Bertrand, in turn presents itself as a
failure, a doomed attempt to find Art; the effect
is thus of a “mise en abyme” of failure.
Mallarmé prefaces his Divagations with a note
that begins: “A book such as I do not like,
those deprived of architecture or unity. No man
escapes decidedly, from journalism.” (Un livre
comme je ne les aime pas, ceux épars et privés
d’architecture. Nul n’échappe décidément, au
journalisme.)35
The art of these writers defines itself as per-
manently attracted toward an unattainable
unity; it remains fragmentary. Nonetheless, it
must maintain the sense of that unity as an
ideal term of art—a unity presented precisely
by reference to art, to other art, which, seen at
a certain distance or from a certain angle, seen
31Monsieur Croche, pp. 269–70 (Le Figaro, 16 May 1902).
32Ibid., p. 305 (Comoedia, 18 May 1911).
33Correspondance, pp. 38–39 (19 Oct. 1885).
34See Baudelaire, Petits poèmes en prose (Paris: GF-
Flammarion, 1967), p. 32.
35Mallarmé, Œuvres complètes, II, 82.
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as different from what the poets themselves
can do, has that character of oneness they can-
not achieve. This is an inescapable dynamic of
the post-Romantic aesthetic. The new work is
never itself ideal, but it idealizes a vision of an
art outside itself, an art whose completeness
parallels an imagined completeness of nature.
Although in the passages I have just cited it is
architecture and Gaspard de la Nuit that play
the part of idealized works, more often (and
almost always in more fully developed argu-
ments) it is music. And similarly, or rather
conversely, Debussy, when considering his own
work, describes it not as an ideal achievement,
but in terms of what he has been trying to do. It
is seen as an attempt rather than as a result or
an end in itself; it exhibits an ambition, a de-
sire; beyond it may be poetry, but poetry as an
idealized unity, “toute la poésie” in parallel
with an equally totalized, equally unrealized,
equally absent nature.
The function of texts, of poetry, of programs,
and of the verbal generally, therefore, in the
context of Debussy’s music, is not at all to
provide a meaning to the music or an explana-
tion of it. Beyond individual works, anecdotes,
or scenes, poetry and nature conjoined serve as
the horizon and vanishing point of music. We
must look toward them—hence the words at-
tached to Debussy’s compositions; but we must
never go through the music to reach them, for
if we did, if we arrived at them, they would
become fragmented into texts and Debussy
would be reduced to the status of a “traducteur-
assermenté.”
Once we have accepted the full consequences
of this, we can at last, I think, begin to over-
come what has long been a blind spot in our
understanding of the aesthetics of the period.
The obstinate image of poetry as music has
traditionally been explained by reference to
Mallarmé’s assertion that poetry was, in his
time, trying to take back from music what
belonged to literature, as if a certain essential
quality of music existed and needed first to be
extracted from audible concert-hall or opera-
house music and then reimported into litera-
ture. But if one conceives the process thus, it
becomes impossible to understand why poetry
should occupy a place in Debussy’s writing so
similar to the place of music in Mallarmé’s. In
fact, music does not contain an essence that
the poem extracts; rather, it represents, for the
poet, one of the two poles of an oscillation
between meaning and non-meaning, between
fragmentation and totality, which alone allows
a space for art. Crudely put, from the poet’s
point of view, art is not meaning; therefore, it
must be music. But music without meaning
would be unarticulated; therefore it could not
be written. What is needed is a dynamic that
allows for the constant articulated vanishing of
meaning. For that, both music and poetry are
necessary, so that each can look toward the
other and project thither that vanishing. In
music, we need titles or programs36—and a sense
of our incapacity, of the futility and imperti-
nence of the endeavor, when we try to analyze
them, to calculate strictly their value. In po-
etry, we need music—and that same sense of
incapacity, futility, and impertinence when we
try to calculate the presence of
that music. l
36Of course, we have not always needed them; these re-
marks apply only at a certain point in the aesthetic argu-
ment, articulated most forcefully, for me, by Mallarmé
and Debussy. If I may allow myself one observation to do
with music history, necessarily tentative and general: it
seems to me that one of Debussy’s innovations, very much
analogous to the invention of the prose poem by Baudelaire,
is to replace the inadequacy of formal analysis by inad-
equacy of reference. In an idealized past, composers in-
cluding Rameau, Mozart, or Beethoven created works
within a tradition that led one to expect certain things of
the music’s form. The artistic force, the horizon or vanish-
ing point of this music, derives from the way in which it
escapes from that form while confirming the form’s neces-
sity. (An analysis of Rameau’s writing would, I suggest,
allow one to demonstrate this process operating through
his opposition between mathematics and taste.) In Debussy,
to some extent, meaning, reference, or program replaces
form in the unavoidable expectations it creates and in the
way it exceeds those expectations. This creates difficulties
in music analysis in the same way that prose poetry cre-
ates difficulties in literary analysis.
Abstract.
This article sets out to examine what Debussy wrote
about music in the light of the discourse on music,
literature, and nature that Debussy knew from con-
temporary literature. It becomes apparent that
Debussy shares with, for example, Mallarmé a re-
fusal to consider that his work renders natural scenes
present. Indeed, he rejects entirely the notion that
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music can or should represent anything (when it
appears to represent, it is, precisely, not music).
Debussy accordingly despises programs and critics
who look in his music for images or ideas that they
expect him to have put there.
Why, then, does he give his pieces programmatic
titles? And how is one to understand the relation-
ship between words and music, for example, in
Pelléas et Mélisande? The answer emerges from an
analysis of the special relationship that Debussy con-
structs between music and nature. On the one hand,
Debussy tells us that “art is the most beautiful of
lies”; accordingly, music never tells us any specific
articulated truth about nature. On the other hand,
the dynamics of our perception of nature, in which
we see through specific features, as poetry might
articulate them, to an inexpressible totality, a
“mouvement total de la nature,” is the best ana-
logue for the process of musical creation, which
traverses sense toward an ideal unity beyond the
articulation of meaning. Our duty, then, would be to
look past the expression of the words associated
with Debussy’s music, not to find in the music an
extension or repetition of the words’ meaning, but
to sense, between as well as beyond them, an echo of
that ideal unity.
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